

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T0075R00030007

RECEIVED
Release in 1999 pursuant to E.O. 13526, A-RDP85-0175R0003-000700

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

01 of 01

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

STATSPEC




F B I S

TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE:

Reorganization of North Vietnamese Council of Ministers



STATSPEC


Confidential

10 APRIL 1974

CONFIDENTIAL

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

STATSPEC



NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

CONTENTS

SALT

Moscow Conveys Concern Over Deadlock in Negotiations. 1

EUROPE

Moscow Backs French Leftists, Praises Pompidou's Policies 3

Moscow Takes Restrained Note of UK-EC Differences 4

ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

USSR Urges Return to Geneva Talks, Exchanges Barbs With Egypt 6

INDOCHINA

Coalition Government Formed in Laos After Long Delay. 9

Peking, Pyongyang Warmly Receive Cambodian Front Delegation 11

COMMUNIST RELATIONS

Moscow, Budapest Promote Drive for New World Party Conclave 16

USSR

New Collections of Brezhnev's Speeches Proliferate. 18

New Brezhnev Agricultural Program for Central Russia Aired. 21

Alma-Ata Secretary Becomes CPSU Light Industry Section Head 23

CHINA

Peking Keeps Lid on Confucius Campaign, But Suggest Targets 24

NOTES

Moscow on U.S.-Soviet Contacts; Teng Hsiao-ping to UN 26

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

CONTENTS (Continued)

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: Reorganization of North Vietnamese
Council of Ministers. S 1

APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics i

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 1 -

SALT

MOSCOW CONVEYS CONCERN OVER DEADLOCK IN NEGOTIATIONS

Moscow has expressed its concern about the stalemate reached in the Geneva negotiations. In a 7 April PRAVDA article criticizing continued opposition to SALT in the United States. The article by Valentin Larionov, a specialist on military aspects of U.S. foreign policy at the USA Institute, was critical of the continuing modernization of the U.S. strategic arsenal and of the new U.S. missile targeting strategy advanced by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger last January. The unmistakable thrust of the article was to reject pressures for changes in Moscow's position on SALT arising from strategic developments in the United States. Although the article comes on the heels of a strong effort by Moscow to counter Western press assertions that the 24-28 March Kissinger visit failed to make progress on a range of issues including SALT, Larionov did not broach the Kissinger visit or its aftermath in his article.

Larionov warned that the recent developments in U.S. strategic programs and doctrine were "relapses into the cold war" which "cannot but damage the process of normalizing the international atmosphere." He did not, however, break any new ground in his criticism. His response to both the Secretary's statements on missile targeting strategy and to recent Western discussion of possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe echoed earlier Soviet commentary in arguing that the very consideration of a limited nuclear exchange tends to lower the barriers to nuclear war and thus "casts a shadow" on the U.S.-Soviet prevention of nuclear war agreement signed last June. Nevertheless, his article represents the most authoritative public response to date to the missile targeting debate in the United States. A. Platonov and L. Alekseyev had skirted the subject in an earlier article on SALT in the 14 February PRAVDA.

Like Platonov and Alekseyev, Larionov balanced criticism of adverse developments within the United States with a more positive note. He asserted that leaders on both sides are "exerting efforts (and urging other countries to do the same) to bring about a limitation above all in that sphere of armaments which holds the most dangerous potential." Moreover,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 2 -

he concluded that despite the most recent developments the "political atmosphere" is still more propitious for agreement than during the first stage of SALT and that as a result "the negotiations can lead to constructive results if both sides have a real desire to reach agreement." Unlike Platonov and Alekseyev, however, he did not mention the commitment made at the June summit to seek agreement by the end of 1974.

Larionov is a retired colonel who has acquired a reputation as a hardliner because of his rather hawkish treatment of U.S. weapons programs in the past. Thus his selection to write the PRAVDA article appears to be designed to strengthen the credibility of Moscow's firm stance on SALT at this time.

Larionov was chosen to perform a similar role following the conclusion of the SALT ONE agreements in 1972. His article in the 8 September NEW TIMES (No. 37) capped a public effort by Moscow--pegged to the congressional debate on ratification of the May agreements--to warn against U.S. moves to offset the interim offensive agreement's quantitative limitations through qualitative improvements.* Larionov argued in the article that a new emphasis on qualitative development would "contravene the very spirit of the agreements concluded." In the current PRAVDA article he again showed concern over the implications of a persisting U.S. technological lead, such as in warhead accuracy. He cautioned that "the militarists of the seventies are placing great hopes on the return, even if only in the long run, of the lost strategic superiority of the United States by means of qualitative improvement of weapons. . . ."

* The TRENDS of 13 September 1972, pages 27-29, discusses Moscow's reaction to the congressional debate over the initial SALT agreements.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 3 -

EUROPE

MOSCOW BACKS FRENCH LEFTISTS, PRAISES POMPIDOU'S POLICIES

Initial low-level Moscow reaction to the French presidential elections indicates that the Soviet Union is giving pro-forma support to the PCF's strategy of backing Socialist party leader Francois Mitterand, as the candidate of the leftist coalition, on the first ballot scheduled for 5 May. This is in accordance with Moscow's usual practice of supporting the electoral strategy of local communist parties and does not necessarily indicate that the Soviet Union would prefer Mitterand to the eventual Gaullist candidate. Indeed, the praise accorded Pompidou's policies by Soviet media in the aftermath of his death suggests that Moscow may prefer a continuation of a Gaullist regime to the unknown quantity that would be represented by a less nationalist-minded leader.

Almost immediately after President Pompidou's 2 April death, Moscow radio and TASS began publicizing PCF and communist-dominated trade union appeals for a single leftist candidate supported by the PCF, the Socialist Party (PS), and the left Radicals under the aegis of the three parties' Joint Program. Moscow's apparent endorsement of the PCF's strategy, however, stopped short of direct acclaim for Mitterand personally. The possibility of an ultimate victory for Mitterand thus poses questions for Moscow relating to French foreign and internal policies, and Soviet media have to date maintained a significant silence on this possibility.

Until relatively recently Mitterand was a consistent public critic of the Kremlin and, as a result, a favorite bete noire of Soviet comment. But as Mitterand in recent months has sought to increase his stature as a presidential candidate and has softened his public criticism of the Kremlin, Moscow similarly has increased favorable publicity for him. Commenting on the 8 April endorsement by the three leftist parties of Mitterand, Moscow radio's French service said that Paris and Western press observers rated Mitterand's "personal" standing as high. The radio cited a Paris paper to point out that a joint leftist candidate could outpoll all other candidates on the first ballot, but it stopped short of commenting on a prospective second ballot in which the Gaullists believe they can win a runoff between a single Gaullist-supported candidate and Mitterand.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 4 -

As regards Pompidou, Moscow has heaped glowing praise on the former president as a worthy successor to General de Gaulle in furthering the successful development of detente and cooperation between France and the Soviet Union. Moscow radio's French service on the 3d went so far as to say that Pompidou's "political testament" was epitomized in his recent remarks to journalists in Pitsunda during his talks with Brezhnev. Pompidou was quoted as saying that Soviet-French cooperation and friendship were the result of history, geography, General de Gaulle's policies, and those of the current Soviet and French leaders. According to the radio, Pompidou added that this policy of cooperation must continue and be expanded for the good of the two countries and the stability of Europe. The favorable praise for the Gaullist tradition as it affects Soviet-French relations may be interpreted as Moscow's subtle way of expressing its preference for another eventual Gaullist victory in the current elections.

MOSCOW TAKES RESTRAINED NOTE OF UK-EC DIFFERENCES

Moscow reacted in low-keyed fashion to British Foreign Secretary Callaghan's announcement, at the EC Council of Ministers meeting on 1-2 April in Luxembourg, of his government's intention either to obtain renegotiation of the terms of its membership in the Common Market or to withdraw its membership. In a series of TASS and Moscow radio items Moscow has indicated that the British move provides further evidence of increased West European disunity and reveals the economic and political disadvantages for European countries in Common Market membership. This restrained reaction is generally consistent with Moscow's practice on intra-European issues, and apparently reflects its belief that a hands-off attitude serves its interests better than a heavy-handed show of partisanship. If it had wished to exploit the issue, the materials were ready at hand.

Reaction in the West European press to Britain's announcement was varied but generally unsympathetic, tending to present the development as a major crisis for the EC and a setback for European unity. Some of the more critical comment accused the Wilson government of being guided by narrow domestic political considerations, as well as by short-sighted nationalistic interests, at the expense of the larger European community. Other critical comment accused Britain of failing to honor diplomatic obligations, upsetting its allies and threatening to deadlock future EC deliberations for months.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 5 -

Soviet comment has alluded briefly to some of these critical themes but has not replayed them in detail. Moscow radio's weekly observers' roundtable noted on 7 April, for example, that the EC Council of Ministers meeting had stimulated a "whole avalanche of comment" and pessimistic concern for the future of the EC in the West European press. But in the subsequent brief discussion of this development, IZVESTIYA observer Mikhaylov focused almost entirely on the substantive content of Callaghan's speech, remarking that the British announcement was faithful to a well-known public position of the Labor Party, should have surprised no one, and requested adjustment only for "the most serious liabilities" of EC membership. Noting that the British announcement had "met with hostility," Mikhaylov concluded blandly that "the crisis in inter-state relations in the West continues to mount."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 6 -

ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

USSR URGES RETURN TO GENEVA TALKS, EXCHANGES BARBS WITH EGYPT

In a period of lessened diplomatic activity on the Arab-Israeli problem, Moscow has continued to call for an early resumption of the Geneva peace conference while avoiding detailed comment on the disengagement issue. At the same time, in broadcasts in Arabic it has indicated its displeasure with Egypt on a variety of counts, ranging from as-Sadat's recent public criticism of the Soviet Union to Cairo's trend toward economic liberalization. Moscow has also played up the second anniversary of the Soviet-Iraqi friendship and cooperation treaty and has continued to publicize the forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union of Syrian President al-Asad.

**SYRIAN-ISRAELI
DISENGAGEMENT** Without overtly denigrating Secretary Kissinger's efforts to bring about disengagement on the Golan front, Moscow has made clear its impatience to get back in the negotiating picture through a resumption of the Geneva talks. Matveyev in an international review in IZVESTIYA on the 2d referred to the "urgency" of resuming the Geneva conference, saying that only within such a framework, "not by means of any other combinations," would it be possible to achieve a stable political settlement. Middle East specialist Belyayev, in the domestic service observers' roundtable on the 7th, similarly called for a return to Geneva and dismissed any notion of "dwelling on some kind of individual measures."

Soviet treatment of Israeli Defense Minister Dayan's visit to Washington at the end of March to present Israel's proposals on disengagement on the Syrian front typically focused more on the issue of further U.S. military aid to Israel and Dayan's talks with Secretary Schlesinger than on his disengagement discussions with Secretary Kissinger. Moscow linked the tension on the Golan front with Dayan's visit, attributing the Golan clashes to Israel's desire to convince the United States of the continued need for financial and military aid. A RED STAR article on the 7th, noting that Dayan had gone to Washington "ostensibly" to discuss disengagement, found it "very significant" that talks with Schlesinger were included in his program.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 7 -

RED STAR, like other comment, also saw the Golan clashes as evidence of Tel Aviv's refusal to withdraw from the area, pointing to a statement by Dayan in Washington that he did not believe Israel would return the Golan Heights to Syria. RED STAR observed that the conclusions of Israel's Agranat commission investigating Israeli preparedness last October stemmed from the need to find a scapegoat and showed that Israeli leaders did not intend to change their "adventurist" policy.

TASS on the 9th in a one-sentence item reported the departure of a Syrian delegation for Washington "in view of the pending negotiations" on Syrian-Israeli disengagement along the Golan ceasefire line. Moscow has supported Syria's firm position on disengagement, with PRAVDA's international review on the 7th referring approvingly to Damascus' "logical" position that it would not accept a "partial solution" nor any plan for separation of forces which did not stipulate Israeli withdrawal from Syrian territory occupied in 1967 and 1973. In effect justifying Syrian fire on the Golan Heights, PRAVDA cited the Damascus AL-BA'TH as declaring that Syrian military action was aimed at preventing Israel from advancing and fortifying its positions. And a PRAVDA dispatch on the 6th said that Israel was strengthening and improving its positions, "creating a system of long-term defense," and beefing up its forces by transferring major contingents from rear areas.

Reporting President al-Asad's speech on the Ba'th Party anniversary, TASS on the 8th noted without comment that he declared Syria would continue its political activities aimed at settling the conflict but would not stop the "armed struggle" directed toward achieving this goal. In his speech, broadcast by Damascus radio on the 7th, al-Asad also cryptically rejected criticism of Syria's "inflexible" stand not only by "some of our Arab brothers" but also by "some of those who share our problem from a distance."

RELATIONS Threaded through much of Soviet comment on the Middle
WITH EGYPT East are critical digs at Egypt's belief in a "change" in U.S. policy toward the Arabs, along with its support for lifting the oil embargo and its espousal of "economic openness" in encouraging foreign investment and in effect turning away from Nasir's socialist policies. Moscow responded indirectly but transparently to President as-Sadat's remarks, in his 3 April Alexandria speech, that the Soviet Union had been opposed to military action to "activate" the Arab-Israeli dispute, and his complaints of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 8 -

Soviet delays in sending promised military supplies.* Not acknowledging that it was responding to as-Sadat, Moscow rhetorically inquired in an Arabic-language commentary the next day why the USSR gave Arab countries modern military equipment--without which "it would have been impossible" for Egypt and Syria to score successes in the October war--if it did not support the Arabs' use of armed force. Implicitly responding to as-Sadat's charge that the Nixon-Brezhnev summits, by agreeing on "military relaxation," froze the Arab-Israeli problem, the broadcast claimed that the Soviet Union employed "the circumstances of international detente" as another means of defending the Arabs' rights. In this and other comment Moscow employed the device of quoting statements by Dayan and Eban critical of Soviet Mideast policies to indicate the effectiveness of Moscow's support for the Arabs.

Moscow has also been responding to Cairo press criticism: A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Arabic on the 8th carried a rejoinder to a 6 April article by AKHBAR AL-YAWM chief editor al-Quddus, berating him for contending that the USSR was responsible for the stalemate in Syrian-Israeli disengagement. According to a MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY report, al-Quddus argued that Egypt was pursuing the same line as the Soviet Union in seeking detente with the United States, although "Soviet politicians believe detente to be a right restricted to the two superpowers." He also seemed to be obliquely referring to Soviet tactics when he mentioned unidentified "aims" to create a Fertile Crescent bloc of Iraqi-Syrian unity against Egypt.

Despite its continuous lectures on the need for Arab unity, Moscow has not been above fanning reported Syrian-Egyptian differences. In the course of advance publicity for Syrian President al-Asad's forthcoming visit to Moscow, TASS on the 8th disseminated an interview with the Syrian ambassador to the Soviet Union clearly aimed at President as-Sadat. The ambassador was reported as questioning the belief of "those who maintain" that "certain imperialist circles supporting Israel have changed their positions" in view of the continued supply of weapons and financial aid to Tel Aviv. TASS cited the ambassador as declaring that "blind trust in every kind of verbal promise is as out of place in politics as thick-headedness and fanaticism."

* According to AL-AKHBAR on the 7th, as reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, a Soviet student delegation attending the student conference addressed by as-Sadat withdrew following as-Sadat's speech; the delegation left for home after receiving a cable from the Soviet Union instructing it to return to Moscow.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 9 -

INDOCHINA

COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMED IN LAOS AFTER LONG DELAY

The long-delayed formation of a coalition government and council in Laos has prompted predictable statements of approval from the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) and its supporters in Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow. At the same time LPF comment has warned that the United States and its "henchmen" still harbor "dark schemes to prevent and sabotage" the coalition. King Savang Vatthana's investiture of the two bodies came on 5 April--more than a year after the 23 March 1973 date specified in the 21 February 1973 Vientiane agreement.* A September protocol on implementation of the Vientiane agreement had termed as "independent and equal" the two bodies--the Provisional National Union Government (PNUG) headed by Premier Souvanna Phouma, and the National Coalition Political Council (NCPC) headed by LPF Chairman Souphanouvong. The September protocol also stipulated that the NCPC would work closely with the government on both domestic and foreign policy formulation, the implementation of the 1973 agreements, and the organization of the general elections.

The LPF's determination to insure that the NCPC has equal stature with the government was reflected in its choice of personnel to fill positions allotted to it in the government and the council. In addition to naming Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit deputy premier and foreign minister in the government, the Front designated LPF Central Committee members for two of its 10 other government posts. In the NCPC Souphanouvong will have five members of the LPF Central Committee serving under him out of the total of 15 other posts that the Front was allotted. The LPF's other positions in the government and NCPC were given to members of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces and relatively obscure, nonpolitical functionaries.

Consistent with the Pathet Lao practice of focusing its attacks on the United States since the Vientiane agreement, a 6 April LPF Central Committee appeal assailed "the policy of aggression of the United States and its henchmen in Laos and Indochina." The appeal viewed the creation of a new government in Laos as "a heavy setback for U.S. neocolonialism and a handful of warmongers,"

* Various aspects of the protracted negotiations are discussed in the TRENDS of 25 April 1973, pages 7-8; 16 May 1973, pages 12-14; 23 May 1973, pages 7-9; 6 June 1973, pages 7-9; 12 September 1973, pages 1-3; and 27 February 1974, pages 13-14.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 10 -

who it warned would continue to carry out "dark schemes" to sabotage the coalition. An unusually caustic Pathet Lao radio commentary on the same day hailed the continuing struggle against "the ruthlessness and brutality of the bellicose U.S. imperialists and their henchmen." The PATHET LAO NEWS AGENCY on the 7th transmitted a lengthy indictment of U.S. policy in Laos since World War II, mentioning pointedly that the United States had long coveted the 'abundant natural resources' available in the country.*

In the hours immediately preceding the installation of the new coalition, the Pathet Lao radio began to promote Souphanouvong's status in the new hierarchy by referring to him as "Chairman His Highness Prince Souphanouvong, our beloved leader." On the day of the investiture, however, a message was monitored on a Pathet Lao point-to-point radioteletype circuit directing that the phrase "our beloved leader" be eliminated from the new standard formulation, reflecting some sensitivity about excessive exaltation of Souphanouvong in the circumstances of implementing a new arrangement with RLG leaders. Pathet Lao media have dwelled, however, on the "enthusiastic" welcome accorded Souphanouvong on his arrival in both Vientiane and Luang Prabang.

FOREIGN REACTION Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow have manifested their official support for the establishment of the coalition in Laos. Congratulatory messages were sent to Souphanouvong--by DRV President Ton Duc Thang and National Assembly Chairman Truong Chinh, PRC National People's Congress Chairman Chu Te, and Soviet President Podgornyy; to Souvanna Phouma--by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong, PRC Premier Chou En-lai, and Soviet Premier Kosygin; and to the Lao King--by DRV President Ton Duc Thang and PRC acting Chairman Tung Pi-wu. The top echelon North Vietnamese leaders hosted the entire LPF/PNF contingent in Hanoi while en route to Vientiane and Luang Prabang.

In references to U.S. policy in Laos, communist comment hailing the coalition followed familiar patterns: Hanoi was unrestrained in its criticism and Peking and Moscow were circumspect. A 6 April NHAN DAN editorial, for example, accused the United States of resorting "to the most barbarous and perfidious maneuvers" and

* Two service messages transmitted on the Pathet Lao point-to-point radioteletype circuit on 9 April directed that congratulatory messages from the United States, South Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Israel should not be reported by Pathet Lao radio.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 11 -

of trying to impose a "neocolonialist yoke" on the Lao people. PEOPLE'S DAILY, on the other hand, published a brief editorial on the 7th that restricted its direct criticism of the United States to historical events, asserting that the United States had instigated the Lao rightists to overthrow the two previous coalition governments. Available Moscow central media reaction has avoided references to the United States, but a radio broadcast in Lao on the 5th called the coalition "a victory of justice over the Americans and the ultrarightist reactionary clique who tried to settle the Lao problem by violent means."

PEKING, PYONGYANG WARMLY RECEIVE CAMBODIAN FRONT DELEGATION

Following a high-level welcome in Hanoi during a 28 March-1 April visit, the Cambodian Front delegation led by insurgent armed forces chief Khieu Samphan and his "special advisor" Ieng Sary was given comparable treatment during visits to Peking and Pyongyang, effectively cementing an image of Asian communist solidarity with the Cambodian struggle. The delegation arrived in Peking from Hanoi on 1 April and stayed until the 5th, when it left for Pyongyang, where it visited for three days before returning to Peking on the 8th. In both China and North Korea, the delegates were received and feted by top-level officials, including Mao Tse-tung and Kim Il-song, and spoke at a full round of receptions and rallies attended by strong representations from the PRC and DPRK Politburos.

Speeches by Khieu Samphan in Peking and Pyongyang played up the same themes that had marked his international debut in Hanoi last week.* He routinely reaffirmed Front determination to achieve the five points, called attention to continued insurgent victories of "strategic significance," duly attacked the chief members of the Lon Nol regime by name, and showed continued sensitivity over alleged U.S. plans for a "sham peace" and cease-fire short of Front objectives.

Samphan carefully acknowledged the titular leading position of the China-based Front contingent led by "head of state" Prince Sihanouk and RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth, who were in Peking to greet Samphan on arrival. Sihanouk had returned to Peking on 28 March from Canton--his prime residence in China since his ailing mother's arrival there last November. He was greeted at the Peking airport as usual by Chou En-lai. Sihanouk and Penn

* Samphan's stay in Hanoi is discussed in the TRENDS of 3 April 1974, pages 9-11.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 12 -

Nouth have attended all major Chinese ceremonial functions in honor of the Front delegation, including its meetings with Mao on 2 April, but were notably absent from two working-level meetings which Chou held with Samphan and Sary on 2 and 4 April. NCNA reported that Sihanouk on the 3d gave a reception for Samphan and Sary, at which he reiterated Front resolve not to reconcile with Lon Nol.

U.S. ROLE IN CAMBODIA Throughout his tour, Khieu Samphan has been at pains to stress the impact of continued U.S. involvement in the Cambodian conflict following the 15 August 1973 U.S. bombing halt, and to charge that Washington has recently endeavored to step up its interference through increased economic and military aid to Lon Nol and through direct command of the Phnom Penh administration by growing numbers of U.S. advisers. This approach was earlier initiated authoritatively in a 20 March RGNU Propaganda and Information Ministry statement and was followed in comment marking the 23 March Front anniversary. Propaganda has maintained that stepped-up U.S. interference and aid has been responsible for Lon Nol's continued survival, and has, in effect, excused public Front predictions late last year that the 1973-74 dry season offensive would finish off the enemy. Samphan had been in the forefront of those predicting decisive success last fall, but he appeared to acknowledge the present military stalemate in a 3 April rally speech in Peking which cited heavy U.S. involvement in noting that the insurgents "are determined to fight this bloody war on a long-term basis."

While rationalizing Front failure to end the present military stalemate, Samphan's stress on the U.S. role has also seemed designed to revive support from Front allies in Peking and Hanoi, who have been increasingly restrained in their backing of Front objectives over the past year. Notably, Peking and Hanoi have generally softpedaled specific support for the Front demand regarding the overthrow of the Lon Nol regime. In the wake of the U.S. bombing halt, both allies significantly reduced public attention to the U.S. role in Cambodia, suggesting that they viewed the situation as one in which the Cambodian people should "settle their own affairs" without major outside support. By stressing Washington's continued and allegedly expanding involvement in Cambodia, Samphan in effect has reminded both backers of their internationalist obligation to continue and increase support for the Cambodian struggle against outside "imperialism."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 13 -

To make the Front position more attractive to its Chinese and Vietnamese allies, Samphan's stress on the U.S. role has been accompanied by a notable softpedaling of his previous emphasis on the need to "annihilate" the Lon Nol regime. Rather than focus as in the past on his uncompromising resolve to drive out the United States and to destroy the Phnom Penh regime before peace will be restored, Samphan endeavored to put a more reasonable gloss on his settlement stance, stressing the Front's desire for peace and asserting that U.S. interference alone is responsible for holding back peace. Though he duly affirmed Front resolve to achieve the five points and to overthrow the Lon Nol regime, Samphan did not--as he has in the past--specifically call for the regime's overthrow as a condition for peace.

CAMBODIAN-PRC
RELATIONS

In his speeches in Peking, Samphan was notably more effusive regarding Chinese aid and relations with the Front than he had been concerning Front-DRV ties while in Hanoi. He hailed Peking's "unqualified support and assistance," and said that Front-PRC friendship "is a pure one based on correct principles of equality, mutual benefit, and unqualified mutual respect." The Chinese reciprocated, putting on a large show of PRC solidarity with the Cambodian and Indochinese struggles. Aside from their meeting with Mao, the delegates have thus far been addressed by Chou En-lai at a banquet on the 1st and by Wang Hung-wen at a rally on the 3d, which occasioned the turnout of eleven full and two alternate PRC Politburo members.

Chinese speakers at the various activities have duly supported the Front's five points, hailed the RGNU as the "sole legal government" of Cambodia, and affirmed Sihanouk's status as "head of state." They promised "all-out support and assistance" for the Cambodian struggle, and duly criticized continued U.S. aid for the "traitorous Lon Nol clique," demanding that Washington stop its interference and allow the Cambodians to settle their own affairs. The Chinese also used the occasion to reaffirm support for the PRG's recent six-point plan and to reiterate the demand that Washington and Saigon abide by the Paris agreement.

PRC FOREIGN POLICY

To underline Chinese unity with the Cambodian and other revolutionary struggles, the Chinese used the occasion of the visit to recall Mao's 20 May 1970 statement pegged to the U.S. invasion of Cambodia--a statement which had not been cited by PRC media in recent months. However, Peking was careful to avoid stressing the salient anti-U.S., anti-Nixon Administration features of the 1970 Mao statement,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 14 -

emphasizing instead the broad Maoist belief that the Indochinese peoples' example has shown that by resolute struggle a small and seemingly weak oppressed people can defeat a powerful aggressor.

In a further demonstration of revolutionary solidarity, Wang Hung-wen on the 3d disclosed the new Mao instruction that "we are communists, and must help the people. If we do not help the people, then it is a betrayal of Marxism." Chou En-lai had appeared to allude to this instruction in a 24 March banquet speech for the Tanzanian president when he affirmed Peking's "bounden proletarian internationalist duty" to aid world revolutionary struggles and asked rhetorically: "How can a communist party or a socialist country be worthy of its name if it does not support the people's revolutionary struggles?" In a 6 March 1971 Hanoi rally address Chou had referred to a similar Mao instruction in the Vietnamese context, which asserted that "If anyone among us should say that we should not help the Vietnamese people in their struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, that will be betrayal, betrayal of the revolution."

The Peking leaders also used the opportunity of the delegation's visit to lecture the Cambodians on the Chinese view of the international situation, particularly the belief that continuing "world disorder" stemming from U.S.-Soviet rivalry and Third World opposition to the superpowers is the salient feature of the present age and is having a beneficial impact for China and for oppressed peoples throughout the world. Chou's speech on the 1st appeared to allude to the conclusion of Secretary Kissinger's 24-28 March stay in Moscow in stressing the Chinese belief that despite talk of detente and "lasting peace," superpower rivalry will continue, providing opportunity for advantageous Chinese maneuvering within the triangular relationship.

Wang Hung-wen, in his first major speech since his report at the 10th CCP Congress last August, added his endorsement to Chou's assessment of international affairs in his rally speech on the 3d, pointing out that U.S.-Soviet rivalry has spread from the crucial area of Europe to the Middle East, Mediterranean, and Indian Ocean, in spite of efforts toward reconciliation. Wang also took the opportunity to clarify the seeming ambiguity in his report last August regarding where Peking presently sees the major threat of attack against China. In his 24 August address, Wang had called on the Chinese people to "prepare well against any war of aggression and guard against surprise attack by imperialism and social-imperialism." His 3 April speech

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 15 -

carefully dropped the allusion to the United States and focused solely on the USSR in stating that the Chinese are prepared against "a surprise attack launched by social-imperialism."

Although Moscow media have given the Front delegation's visits only passing notice, Moscow radio on 5 April harshly rebutted the "anti-Soviet action" of Wang's rally speech. The report noted that Wang is considered the "third most important person in the Peking hierarchy" and carefully cited his close ties to Mao's entourage, suggesting that Moscow sees little indication that this representative of the younger generation in Peking will prove any more moderate toward Moscow than his elders.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 16 -

COMMUNIST RELATIONS

MOSCOW, BUDAPEST PROMOTE DRIVE FOR NEW WORLD PARTY CONCLAVE

Moscow's reluctance to take the lead in calling for a new international conference of communist parties was evidenced most recently in a 30 March PRAVDA editorial article which typically focused on appeals for a conference by other parties. The article, keyed to the third anniversary of the 24th CPSU Congress, said without elaboration that "the CPSU deeply understands the urge of the fraternal parties to once again exchange opinions" on topical world issues. Five days later, an authoritative article in the 4 April NEPSZABADSAG reiterated Budapest's support for a new conference and served notice that the Hungarians are ready to play a key role in preparing for a new conference, as they did in connection with the June 1969 Moscow party conference.

The PRAVDA editorial article prefaced its reference to "an exchange of opinions" among the parties by an attack on the "Maoist" leadership of China, a vow to wage an uncompromising struggle "against right and 'left' revisionism," and an assertion that the international situation had "greatly changed" since 1969--the stock arguments currently used by foreign CP supporters of a new conference. Soviet media have duly reported the endorsements of this line by Moscow's five orthodox East European allies and by about a dozen nonruling CP's. On its own, Moscow had in the February issue of PARTY LIFE disputed arguments against a new conference raised by a minor Spanish CP official while at the same time portraying plans for the conference as still in the tentative stage.

HUNGARIAN ARTICLE The 4 April NEPSZABADSAG article, by the authoritative foreign affairs commentator Ferenc Varnai, may be viewed as an effort to improve Budapest's image in Moscow's eyes at a time when it is under heavy Soviet pressure to restructure the Hungarian economic management system along more orthodox lines. Varnai traced Hungarian support for a new conference back to Kadar's speech at the 10th MSZMP Congress in 1970. The author recalled that Kadar had noted the absence of any "international organization" in the communist movement and had urged the adoption of "joint ideological stances" on topical issues.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 17 -

Clearly with Romania in mind, Varnai alluded sarcastically to "people who regard the international conference as a 'threat' to their party's independence." He went on to point out that Moscow had repeatedly given assurances that the movement had no "center," that all national parties were independent and had equal rights, and that no party could prescribe what another party could or could not say at international communist meetings. Continuing in this vein, he warned that "those who pay attention only to their own interests, but do not act for the movement as a whole, are no internationalists." He added that no single country could on its own exert a decisive influence on major world developments.

Varnai also flatly denied "bourgeois" predictions that the new conference would "excommunicate China." He instead insisted that the world movement "never intended" to oust Peking and that it was the Maoist leaders who "isolate themselves."

Varnai's article was clearly in response to Romanian objections to a new conference spelled out by Ceausescu in an interview in the Vienna DIE PRESSE on 23 March. Ceausescu toughened his stance in an interview published in the London GUARDIAN on the 9th, asserting that, because of "the long period of study" needed to accommodate longstanding differences, there was "no question of organizing such a meeting in the immediate future."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 18 -

U S S R

NEW COLLECTIONS OF BREZHNEV'S SPEECHES PROLIFERATE

The Brezhnev cult has reached new heights in recent months, with publication of two new collections of his speeches, glorification of his dominant role in Soviet policy formulation and almost unanimous recognition of his status as head of the CPSU Politburo. With eight collections of his speeches now in print, Brezhnev is rapidly approaching Khrushchev in literary output. The role of Brezhnev's publications in boosting his political stature was highlighted by a 27 March KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA editorial review of one of the newly published collections, which declared that his speeches not only "crystallize the collective mind" of the Politburo but also represent his unique personal contribution to policy making.

In Brezhnev's nine and one half years as party leader, eight collections of his speeches have appeared, as against eleven major collections of Khrushchev speeches during his eleven and one half year reign. Brezhnev's first edition appeared in early 1970, roughly matching the five year germinal period before the publication of Khrushchev's first major collection in 1958. Perhaps of greater importance are the different leadership images projected by the two sets of publications. To judge from the titles of his collected works, Khrushchev's image was depicted in rich colors as a force for world peace, an opponent of war, a tribune of the arts, a spokesman for agricultural interests and an advocate of "goulash communism." By the same token, Brezhnev emerges merely as a businesslike world statesman and an austere authority on agricultural policy, party organization and Komsomol affairs.

BREZHNEV'S COLLECTION Brezhnev has already outdone Khrushchev in the massive volume in which his works have appeared. For example, Brezhnev's main collection--a two-volume 1970 edition--was issued in 500,000 copies. By contrast, Khrushchev's editions never exceeded 250,000 copies and his main collection--an eight-volume edition on agriculture--was issued in only 75,000 copies. Brezhnev's collected works were announced in PRAVDA on the following dates:

2 May 1970--a two-volume general collection of speeches and articles since October 1964, entitled "The Leninist Course"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 19 -

24 May 1970--a collection of speeches on youth, entitled "It Is for the Youth to Build Communism"

31 October 1972--a third volume of speeches, covering 1970-72

11 November 1972--a collection of 1967-72 speeches on foreign affairs, entitled "The CPSU in the Struggle for the Unity of All Revolutionary and Peace-Loving Forces"

4 July 1973--a collection of 1964-72 speeches, entitled "On Current Problems of Party Construction"

13 September 1973--a collection covering 1964-73, entitled "On the Foreign Policy of the CPSU and Soviet State"

15 February 1974--a second, enlarged edition of speeches on youth, covering 1965-73

23 February 1974--a collection of speeches on agriculture as Kazakh leader 1954-56 and as CPSU leader March 1965-December 1973, entitled "Questions of the Agrarian Policy of the CPSU and Cultivation of the Virgin Lands of Kazakhstan"

KHRUSHCHEV'S COLLECTION Although the loquacious Khrushchev had more volumes in print, they usually covered relatively short periods. Collections covering his entire tenure as first secretary began appearing in 1963, most notably an eight-volume collection of agricultural speeches. Aside from a short 1956 collection of speeches to youth and reprints in pamphlet form of individual speeches on special occasions, the following major volumes of Khrushchev speeches were published:

1958--a collection of 1957 speeches, entitled "For a Firm Peace and Peaceful Coexistence"

1959--a reprint of January 1958-November 1958 speeches, entitled "Toward Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism"

1961--a two-volume edition "On the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union in 1960"

1961--a collection of his January 1961-March 1961 speeches, entitled "Raising the Welfare of the People and Tasks of Further Increasing Production of Agricultural Products"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 20 -

1962--a collection of agricultural speeches between October 1961 and March 1962 entitled "The Present Stage of Communist Construction and Tasks of the Party in Improving Leadership of Agriculture"

1962--a two-volume collection of his January 1961-December 1961 speeches entitled "Communism, Peace and the Happiness of Peoples"

1963--an edition entitled "Prevent War, Defend Peace"

1963--a collection of 1956-63 statements on culture entitled "The High Calling of Literature and Art"

1963-64--an eight-volume collection of speeches and writings on agriculture from 1953 to 1964 entitled "The Construction of Communism in the USSR and the Development of Agriculture"

1964--a collection of 1956-64 speeches entitled "On Communist Education"

1964--a collection of 1963 foreign policy speeches entitled "Toward the Victory of Sanity over the Forces of War"

BURGEONING CULT Since the December 1973 CPSU plenum public acknowledgement of Brezhnev as "head" of the Politburo has become virtually standard practice throughout the Soviet Union. The Ukraine and the city of Moscow fell into line with this practice in February and March. At earlier ceremonial meetings in those areas obeisance was paid to the Politburo without reference to Brezhnev.

Brezhnev's dominant role in foreign affairs received unusual praise in an 18 January NEW TIMES article by Yuriy Ivashin. Reviving a formula made familiar in the Stalin era and only rarely used in Khrushchev's day, Ivashin declared that Soviet foreign policy was made "under the direct leadership" of Brezhnev. It is noteworthy that Ivashin coupled praise of Brezhnev's summit diplomacy, which in his view had transformed Moscow into a mecca for leaders of Western as well as communist states, with undisguised contempt for the Soviet foreign affairs establishment. The latter was denigrated as the "'purely administrative' machinery of Soviet power."

The Brezhnev cult was also boosted during the 15 March celebration in Alma-Ata of the 20th anniversary of the virgin lands. The anniversary was converted into a personal glorification of Brezhnev, whose "huge" role in the project was stressed by most speakers. For example,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 21 -

according to the 16 March KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, Uzbek First Secretary Sh. R. Rashidov called Brezhnev the "soul, organizer and inspirer" of the whole struggle to cultivate the Kazakh virgin lands, and Kustanay First Secretary A. M. Borodin declared him the "trail-blazer of those great deeds accomplished in Kazakhstan, Siberia, the Altay and other republics."

Brezhnev's previously neglected activities in the 1950's and 1960's have also been played up in the central press. In a March NEDELYA interview on the virgin land anniversary, Kazakh First Deputy Premier I. G. Slazhnev recalled that Brezhnev's speeches as Kazakh leader in the mid 1950's clearly earmarked him as an "outstanding figure of our party." A 27 March KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA review of Brezhnev's volume of speeches on youth cited his actions as Kazakh first secretary in 1955 as proof of his dynamic style of leadership. In a March OGONEK article, Kustanay First Secretary Borodin recalled Brezhnev's June 1966 visit to the area with Podgornyy and Kunayev and his valuable instructions during the visit. The article was accompanied by a photo of the three leaders on their 1966 visit--which had received minimal publicity at the time.

NEW BREZHNEV AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM FOR CENTRAL RUSSIA AIRED

The CPSU Central Committee-USSR Council of Ministers decree on developing agriculture in the non-black earth zone of the RSFSR, first mentioned by Brezhnev in his 15 March Alma-Ata speech, was published in an abbreviated version in PRAVDA on 3 April. The announced authorization of 35 billion rubles to aid this lagging area during the 1976-80 plan period represents a major new program, for which Brezhnev has received personal credit. Under Khrushchev, the area had been starved for funds in favor of the virgin lands and other areas, farms operated at a loss and the kolkhoz labor force was decimated by massive migration to urban areas. Although the Brezhnev regime moved to increase aid to this area immediately after Khrushchev's ouster, the effort proved to be inadequate.

The area in question includes the northern, Western and central regions of European Russia which is not as richly endowed as the prime agricultural areas of the North Caucasus and the provinces bordering the Ukraine, the so-called "Central Black Earth Zone" and Kazakhstan, the "Southeast Zone." The decree also specifies large inputs of equipment and fertilizer for the area during the next five year plan along with large-scale land improvement work up to 1990.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 22 -

GRANDIOSE SCALE A 4 April PRAVDA editorial characterized the new allocations as "huge," and a 4 April RURAL LIFE editorial spoke of a "significant" increase in investments and "unprecedented" material-technical aid to the area. An article in TRUD on the same day claimed the new allocation of state and kolkhoz funds amounted to an 80 percent increase over that provided in the current five year plan. A 6 April editorial in SOCIALIST INDUSTRY compared the planned future allocation of 120 million tons of fertilizer to the area under the new decree to the total national allocation of 46 million tons of fertilizer to agriculture in 1970.

While reaffirming meat and dairy production as the area's "main branch," the decree indicated this sector will be placed on an industrial basis through construction of a large number of mechanized livestock complexes. To encourage kolkhozniks to remain in the area's backward farms, the decree also provides for a major program of building new settlements with modern housing, schools, hospitals and other facilities to replace existing villages. Brezhnev briefed party and government leaders of non-black earth zone oblasts on the particulars of the decree in a long, unpublished speech delivered at a 3 April conference in Moscow.

RSFSR authorities were quick to praise Brezhnev for the new program. At the 15 March Alma-Ata ceremony where Brezhnev first mentioned the new decree, RSFSR Premier Solomentsev lauded it as an "initiative" of Brezhnev. A 20 March editorial on the decree in the RSFSR Council of Ministers' organ SOVIET RUSSIA likewise praised the May 1966 land improvement program as a measure developed "on the initiative and under the leadership" of Brezhnev.

KHRUSHCHEV POLICY REVERSED In his first statement on agriculture as first secretary, Brezhnev at the March 1965 CPSU plenum had declared that Khrushchev's policies had been more disastrous for the non-black earth zone than for any other region and that the new 1966-70 plan had to devote special attention to this area and to the Baltic and Belorussian republics which shared its problems. At Khrushchev's insistence, the northwest RSFSR, the Baltic and Belorussia had specialized in livestock raising and had suffered reduced allocations. A December 1963 ECONOMIC GAZETTE article arguing that investments in other areas produced greater returns had prompted an outburst of criticism in the press by disgruntled party leaders from the northwest.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 23 -

After Khrushchev's fall, Belorussian First Secretary Mazurov and others assailed the discriminatory policy and called for increased investments. At the March plenum Brezhnev announced measures to aid the area, including lowering of grain procurement quotas and raising prices by 50-100 percent to boost farm profitability. The RSFSR plan for 1966 raised investments in this zone by 26 percent, and the land improvement program adopted in May 1966 provided for extensive drainage work in the zone.

The lag continued, however, prompting Brezhnev to push through additional measures. Smolensk First Secretary I. Ye. Klimenko wrote in the 8 January 1974 SOVIET RUSSIA that in early 1971 a joint party-government decree adopted on Brezhnev's initiative had provided increased investments, equipment, fertilizer and land improvement work in his oblast. Brezhnev had cited Smolensk at the March 1965 plenum as an example of the adverse consequences of Khrushchev's discriminatory agricultural policies.

ALMA-ATA SECRETARY BECOMES CPSU LIGHT INDUSTRY SECTION HEAD

IZVESTIYA on 5 April identified Fedor I. Mochalin as head of the CPSU Central Committee section for light and food industry, filling a long vacancy in that post. Mochalin was an official in the Kazakh textile industry during Brezhnev's tenure as Kazakh first secretary in the mid 1950's. In the early 1960's he became head of the Kazakh Central Committee section for light industry and from 1965 to January 1974 served as Alma-Ata city first secretary.

He succeeds Pavel K. Sizov, who in July 1973 was transferred to head of the newly-created RSFSR Textile Industry Ministry. Sizov had served under Kosygin as secretary of the party committee of the USSR Ministry of Light Industry when Kosygin was minister before Stalin's death. He later became deputy minister of the ministries of consumer goods and textile industry during Kosygin's tenure as overseer of these ministries in the USSR Council of Ministers in the 1950's. In the mid-1960's he served as Central Committee light industry section head at a time when Central Committee Secretary Shelepin was supervising this field. Sizov's demotion was foreshadowed by his failure to be re-elected candidate member of the Central Committee at the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 24 -

CHINA

PEKING KEEPS LID ON CONFUCIUS CAMPAIGN, BUT SUGGESTS TARGETS

Current authoritative Chinese comment on the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius seems aimed at keeping the mass struggle firmly under party control while concomitantly suggesting certain regional PRC leaders as targets of the campaign. This duality is evident in available articles from RED FLAG No. 4, as well as in a 10 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial.

RED FLAG ON WAR MEMOIR An attack on a war memoir, "Lin Biao During the War of Liberation of the Northeast,"* in a RED FLAG article released by NCNA on 7 April, seems to imply criticism of Han Hsien-chu, former Fukien chief now commanding the Lanchow Military Region. The memoir, written by purged former Fukien second party secretary Chou Chih-ping, was supposedly published in booklet form in early 1971 by the Fukien Hsinhua bookstore. The RED FLAG article names neither Chou nor Han, but notes that nothing was done to seriously expose and criticize the memoir "in the place where the booklet was dished up." According to RED FLAG, the article was criticized in 1972, but the purpose of this criticism was merely to defend the local organization and show that "no one 'had approved' it." The article asks rhetorically whether such an important article could be disseminated without the support and approval of other people, but does not further make the point that the only member of the provincial hierarchy ranking above the author was First Secretary Han.

The booklet, which credits Lin with directing civil war PLA operations in the northeast, was denounced as an intrinsic part of the conspiracy directed by Lin and his followers to prepare public opinion for Mao's assassination and the formation of a new central committee. Lashing out at the booklet's thesis, the article asserted that it was Mao, as founder and true commander of the PLA, and not Lin who was actually responsible for the successful military campaigns in the northeast which brought the CCP to power in 1949. "Now is the time," the article urged, "to thoroughly liquidate the scheme of dishing up this booklet."

* Chou's article was originally published in CHINA YOUTH in 1960. The RED FLAG article notes its earlier publication, but concentrates its criticism on the republication in 1971.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 25 -

A second RED FLAG article entitled "That Man Confucius," released by NCNA on 3 April, also pointed up the likelihood that currently active leaders may be targets of the campaign, though without singling out any particular leader. It warned that political swindlers pay close attention to trends and constantly change their course of action to fit the situation. In an obvious allusion to secret Lin supporters within the party, the article recalled the actions of Confucius during an attempted coup d'etat in the state of Lu. He is said to have danced with joy at the news that a coup would be attempted, but following the failure of the coup, he criticized the insurgents, won the trust of the regime and, for a short time, held high office in the state administration.

A RED FLAG commentary broadcast by Peking radio on 4 April concentrated not on the Lin followers, but on the great majority of cases where cadres and masses can, through study and experience, learn the correct revolutionary path. While noting that some cadres, including leading cadres, have failed to learn from summing up experiences, the commentary stressed Mao's teaching that there is "no reason whatsoever for the working class to split into two big irreconcilable groupings."

PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL A 10 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial broke new ground on this authoritative level by its call to "expose" as well as criticize Lin and his followers. At the same time, the editorial also strongly continued the adherence to moderation, notable in PEOPLE'S DAILY editorials since 20 February, by making the first authoritative declaration that revolution must be made only "in spare time." Apparently a companion piece to last month's editorial on spring farming, the editorial describes the current "excellent situation" in industry and calls for achieving "dual success in both revolution and production."

The editorial also touched on the sensitive issue of economic exchanges with foreign countries in warning that enterprises should "get rid of the ideas of admiring and having blind faith in things of foreign origin." It did so, however, in the context of a general paean to the joys of factory self-reliance and building the country through diligence and frugality, suggesting that foreign equipment is being limited not for strictly ideological reasons, but as part of Peking's longstanding drive to limit state funds allocated to economic development.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 26 -

NOTES

MOSCOW ON U.S.-SOVIET CONTACTS: Moscow ignored the more contentious aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations in reporting meetings between President Nixon and Podgornyy in Paris and between Brezhnev and Commerce Secretary Dent in Moscow this week. Moscow has carried only short, straightforward reports on the Nixon-Podgornyy meeting on 7 April, the day after they had attended the memorial service for President Pompidou. TASS' international service and Moscow domestic radio promptly reported on the 7th that the two had met for two hours and discussed both bilateral and international issues. Subsequent reporting in domestic media characterized the discussion as "businesslike and constructive" and noted that they "exchanged opinions" on the Middle East in particular. Moscow's domestic service on the 8th briefly reported White House chief of staff Alexander Haig as telling the press that "the meeting showed very clearly that both the Soviet Union and the United States are very optimistic about the forthcoming Soviet-American summit meeting."

Underscoring the significance Moscow attaches to expanded U.S.-Soviet trade despite apparently bleak prospects for favorable congressional action on the trade bill, Commerce Secretary Dent's 7-10 April visit to the USSR was capped by a meeting with Brezhnev reported by TASS on 9 April. According to TASS, during the "businesslike and constructive" exchange Brezhnev affirmed that the further development of trade and economic ties "constitutes an important element in further improving Soviet-American relations." A TASS interview with Secretary Dent carried on the 10th highlighted his remark that the conversation with Brezhnev "will undoubtedly be of great significance for the further development of trade between the United States and the Soviet Union."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 27 -

TENG HSIAO-PING TO UN: The 6 April departure of Teng Hsiao-ping for the UN general assembly special session in New York marked the first time since the cultural revolution that a Chinese leader of Politburo rank has traveled to a Western country. The turnout of PRC leaders at the airport to see Teng off seemed to be a deliberate attempt to signal to both domestic and foreign audiences that the Chinese leadership, fresh from a similar show of unity during the Peking festivities for a visiting Cambodian delegation, is of one mind concerning foreign policy goals. Chinese television made unusual and prompt efforts to show the domestic audience several minutes of apparently unrestrained leadership friendliness. Madame Mao was frequently shown paired with Chou En-lai, and Yao Wen-yuan was shown in friendly conversation with such generally presumed rivals as Yeh Chien-ying and Li Hsien-nien.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- S 1 -

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

REORGANIZATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

A DRV National Assembly Standing Committee communique, released on 2 April, announced a "new distribution of work and appointments within the Council of Ministers." The decisions appear to be a major step in implementing the program of domestic development laid out at the National Assembly session in February. Shifts have been made in several key economic posts and there are three new vice premiers with special domestic responsibilities.

PLANNING The announcement that the State Planning Commission will be headed by Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi reverts to the pre-war pattern. The Planning Commission was last previously headed by a Politburo member--Nguyen Duy Trinh--from 1958 to 1965, when Trinh gave up the post to become foreign minister. Vice Premier Nguyen Con, a member of the VWP Central Committee, took over the position in April 1965 and held it throughout the war years. Nguyen Con was replaced last June by Nguyen Lam, who concurrently was chief of the State Price Commission.

Lam's June 1973 assignments now appear to have been stopgap measures. Le Thanh Nghi, who as a vice premier has had a major role in the North Vietnamese economy for many years, appeared to have been acting in his new role as early as February: at that time he delivered the report on the economy to the National Assembly session, a report traditionally delivered to assembly sessions by the head of the State Planning Commission.

Nguyen Lam, in this current reshuffle, lost not only the Planning Commission post, but also his position as head of the Price Commission. The 2 April announcement listed no new job for him, though it said that he was to "assume a new assignment." No new head of the Price Commission has been announced.

MACHINERY AND METALLURGY The June 1973 announcement left Nguyen Con with no specific position, although it said that he would "work in the Standing Committee of the Council of Ministers." The 2 April announcement revealed that Nguyen Con is now acting as vice premier in charge of the machinery "sector" (nganhf cow khis) and will also be minister of machinery and metallurgy.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- S 2 -

The former minister of machinery and metallurgy, Dinh Duc Thien, was said to be assuming another--unspecified--assignment. Thien, who had been concurrently serving as chief of the army's General Department of Rear Services, was first identified as the minister of machinery and metallurgy by foreign communist media during travels abroad in October 1970. Hanoi had not named him as the minister when the ministry was created in December 1969 and Hanoi media are not known to have confirmed that he held the ministerial post until June 1971.

NEW VICE PREMIERS Apparently the three new vice premiers were appointed to provide high-level supervision to related ministries. The announcement indicated that each of the three will have responsibility for a broad "bloc" (khoois) in the domestic arena: Tran Huu Duc, a minister of the Premier's Office, will be vice premier in charge of the "internal affairs bloc"; Phan Trong Tue gave up his post as minister of communications and transportation and assumed the position of vice premier in charge of the industry, communications, and transportation bloc; and Dang Viet Chau ceased to be the finance minister while assuming duties as vice premier in charge of the finance, trade, and banking bloc. Apparently the "blocs" will encompass a broader range of activity than the machinery "sector" which Ngueyn Con is slated to oversee--Nguyen Con's more narrow focus appears to be reflected in the fact that, unlike the vice premiers in charge of blocs, he will hold a concurrent post as head of a ministry.

The appointment of vice premiers in charge of blocs appears to bear some resemblance to a system of "boards" (vawn phongf) in the Premier's Office, headed by ministers, which Hanoi used until 1971. There were five such boards set up by the first session of the National Assembly, third legislature, in July 1964--having responsibility for agriculture, industry, finance and commerce, internal affairs, and culture and education. In December 1969 Hanoi created an "Economic Board" to take over the duties of the agriculture, industry, and finance boards, and in August 1970 the head of the Internal Affairs Board died and was not replaced. Finally in April 1971 the head of the Economic Board and the Culture and Education Board gave up their posts and were not replaced. No boards were included in a June 1971 list of government organs, although the former head of the Culture and Education Board evidently continued his functions since he was identified as a minister in the Premier's Office in charge of cultural affairs and education--a position he retains in the current reorganization.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- S 3 -

It seems likely that Tran Huu Duc's "internal affairs bloc" will oversee the state security apparatus. The security orientation of the former Internal Affairs Board had been suggested when it was headed from 1960 to 1965 by Tran Quoc Hoan who acted concurrently as minister of public security. Like Hoan, Duc is a member of the National Defense Council; but his other previous ministerial assignments have been in the field of agriculture. Duc's new responsibilities appeared to have been anticipated last month when he published in the March issue of the party's theoretical journal, HOC TAP, an article entitled: "Strengthen the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, Protect Socialist Property, Manage the Labor Force and Market, and Maintain Social Order and Security." He has also been acting as the chairman of the central steering committee for the general census now underway in North Vietnam--a post compatible with his new security orientation.

Phan Trong Tue and Dang Viet Chau had both held their ministerial positions for several years prior to their current elevation to the rank of vice premier: Tue had been communications minister since July 1960 and Chau had been minister of finance since April 1965. The announcement noted that Tue will be replaced as communications minister by a vice minister, Duong Bach Lien. No new minister of finance was identified.

STATE INSPECTION COMMISSION A change in the leadership of the State Inspection Commission appears to be a followup to shifts made in June 1973 when the commission's chairman, Nguyen Thanh Binh, took on additional duties as minister of water conservancy--a post which will now apparently receive his full-time attention. Binh, who had headed the Inspection Commission since its formation in 1969, has been replaced by Nguyen Van Loc who will give up his position as vice chairman of the Central Agricultural Commission.

REUNIFICATION COMMISSION A shift was also announced in the leadership of the National Reunification Commission, removing its chairman, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Vinh, who is not known to have appeared in public during the past six years. Vinh's replacement is Dang Thi, a minister in the Premier's Office since April 1971 who has served in the past as vice chairman of the State Planning Commission and in a variety of posts in scientific and technical fields. His background is in marked contrast to his predecessor in the commission: Nguyen Van Vinh served concurrently as a VPA deputy chief of staff and as chairman of the Party Central Committee's Reunification Department. And several articles he wrote in the early 1960's on the military situation in South Vietnam appeared to suggest he was active in guiding the combat there.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
10 APRIL 1974

- 1 -

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 1 - 7 APRIL 1974

<u>Moscow (3038 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1181 items)</u>		
Pompidou Death	(--)	7%	Cambodia	(6%)	28%
China	(9%)	7%	[Front Leaders in	(2%)	24%]
24th CPSU Congress 3d	(6%)	5%	DRV, PRC, and DPRK		
Anniversary			Lao Coalition Govern-	(--)	9%
Party-Government	(--)	4%	ment		
Resolution on RSFSR			Pompidou Death	(--)	5%
Agriculture			Criticism of Lin Piao	(7%)	5%
TASS Statement on PRG	(3%)	3%	and Confucius		
22 March 6-Point			UN ECAFE Session in	(2%)	4%
Proposal			Sri Lanka		
Hungarian Liberation	(--)	3%	Middle East	(1%)	4%
29th Anniversary			Kissinger Visit to	(--)	2%
			Moscow		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.